Cryptanalysis of `MAKE'

Daniel Brown; Neal Koblitz; Jason LeGrow

Paper 2021/465

Cryptanalysis of `MAKE'

Daniel Brown, Neal Koblitz, and Jason LeGrow

Abstract

In a recent eprint, Rahman and Shpilrain proposed a Diffie-Hellman style key exchange based on a semidirect product of $n × n$-matrices over a finite field. We show that, using public information, an adversary can recover the agreed upon secret key by solving a system of $n^2$ linear equations.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: key exchange matrix-based cryptanalysis
Contact author(s): koblitz @ uw edu
History: 2021-04-12: revised; 2021-04-12: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2021/465
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/465,
      author = {Daniel Brown and Neal Koblitz and Jason LeGrow},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of `{MAKE}'},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/465},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/465}
}