Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/463

Improving Recent Side-Channel Attacks Against the DES Key Schedule

Andreas Wiemers and Johannes Mittmann

Abstract: Recent publications consider side-channel attacks against the key schedule of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). These publications identify a leakage model depending on the XOR of register values in the DES key schedule. Building on this leakage model, we first revisit a discrete model which assumes that the Hamming distances between subsequent round keys leak without error. We analyze this model formally and provide theoretical explanations for observations made in previous works. Next we examine a continuous model which considers more points of interest and also takes noise into account. The model gives rise to an evaluation function for key candidates and an associated notion of key ranking. We develop an algorithm for enumerating key candidates up to a desired rank which is based on the Fincke–Pohst lattice point enumeration algorithm. We derive information-theoretic bounds and estimates for the remaining entropy and compare them with our experimental results. We apply our attack to side-channel measurements of a security controler. Using our enumeration algorithm we are able to significantly improve the results reported previously for the same measurement data.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Side-channel analysis · Data Encryption Standard (DES) · Key schedule · XOR leakage · Linear regression · Fincke–Pohst enumeration · Mutual information

Date: received 9 Apr 2021

Contact author: alter ego2048 at googlemail com, andreas wiemers@bsi bund de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210412:175401 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/463


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]