Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/395

On the Validity of Spoofing Attack Against Safe is the New Smart

Harishma Boyapally and Urbi Chatterjee and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

Abstract: Recently, a light-weight authenticated key-exchange (AKE) scheme has been proposed. The scheme provides mutual authentication. It is asymmetric in nature by delegating complex cryptographic operations to resource-equipped servers, and carefully managing the workload on resource-constrained Smart meter nodes by using Physically Unclonable Functions. The prototype Smart meter built using commercial-off-the-shelf products is enabled with a low-cost countermeasure against load-modification attacks, which goes side-by-side with the proposed protocol. An attack against this AKE scheme has been recently proposed claiming that the server can be breached to mount spoofing attacks. It relies on the assumption that the result of an attack against authenticated key-exchange protocol is determined before the attacker learns the session key. In this short paper, we discuss the attack’s validity and describe the misinterpretation of the AKE protocol’s security definition.

Category / Keywords: applications / PUF, Authenticated Key-Exchange,

Date: received 24 Mar 2021, last revised 6 Apr 2021

Contact author: harishmasko at gmail com, urbi ism at gmail com, debdeep at cse iitkgp ernet in

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210406:060200 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/395


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]