Paper 2021/395

On the Validity of Spoofing Attack Against Safe is the New Smart

Harishma Boyapally, Urbi Chatterjee, and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

Abstract

Recently, a light-weight authenticated key-exchange (AKE) scheme has been proposed. The scheme provides mutual authentication. It is asymmetric in nature by delegating complex cryptographic operations to resource-equipped servers, and carefully managing the workload on resource-constrained Smart meter nodes by using Physically Unclonable Functions. The prototype Smart meter built using commercial-off-the-shelf products is enabled with a low-cost countermeasure against load-modification attacks, which goes side-by-side with the proposed protocol. An attack against this AKE scheme has been recently proposed claiming that the server can be breached to mount spoofing attacks. It relies on the assumption that the result of an attack against authenticated key-exchange protocol is determined before the attacker learns the session key. In this short paper, we discuss the attack’s validity and describe the misinterpretation of the AKE protocol’s security definition.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
PUFAuthenticated Key-Exchange
Contact author(s)
harishmasko @ gmail com
urbi ism @ gmail com
debdeep @ cse iitkgp ernet in
History
2021-04-06: last of 2 revisions
2021-03-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/395
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/395,
      author = {Harishma Boyapally and Urbi Chatterjee and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay},
      title = {On the Validity of Spoofing Attack Against Safe is the New Smart},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/395},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/395}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/395}
}
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