Paper 2021/391
New Standards for E-Voting Systems: Reflections on Source Code Examinations
Thomas Haines and Peter Roenne
Abstract
There is a difference between a system having no known attacks and the system being secure---as cryptographers know all too well. Once we begin talking about the implementations of systems this issue becomes even more prominent since the amount of material which needs to be scrutinised skyrockets. Historically, lack of transparency and low standards for e-voting system implementations have resulted in a culture where open source code is seen as a gold standard; however, this ignores the issue of the comprehensibility of that code. In this work we make concrete empirical recommendations based on our, and others, experiences and findings from examining the source code of e-voting systems. We highlight that any solution used for significant elections should be well designed, carefully analysed, deftly built, accurately documented and expertly maintained. Until e-voting system implementations are clear, comprehensible, and open to public scrutiny security standards are unlikely to improve.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. VOTING'21
- Keywords
- VotingImplementationStandards
- Contact author(s)
- thomas haines @ ntnu no
- History
- 2021-04-12: revised
- 2021-03-27: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/391
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/391,
author = {Thomas Haines and Peter Roenne},
title = {New Standards for E-Voting Systems: Reflections on Source Code Examinations},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/391},
year = {2021},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/391}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/391}
}
