Paper 2021/319

Tradeoff attacks on symmetric ciphers

Orhun Kara

Abstract

Tradeoff attacks on symmetric ciphers can be considered as the generalization of the exhaustive search. Their main objective is reducing the time complexity by exploiting the memory after preparing very large tables at a cost of exhaustively searching all the space during the precomputation phase. It is possible to utilize data (plaintext/ciphertext pairs) in some cases like the internal state recovery attacks for stream ciphers to speed up further both online and offline phases. However, how to take advantage of data in a tradeoff attack against block ciphers for single key recovery cases is still unknown. We briefly assess the state of art of tradeoff attacks on symmetric ciphers, introduce some open problems and discuss the security criterion on state sizes. We discuss the strict lower bound for the internal state size of keystream generators and propose more practical and fair bound along with our reasoning. The adoption of our new criterion can break a fresh ground in boosting the security analysis of small keystream generators and in designing ultra-lightweight stream ciphers with short internal states for their usage in specially low source devices such as IoT devices, wireless sensors or RFID tags.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Book chapter in Riccardo Bernardini editor: "Cryptography-Recent Advances and Future Developments", Intechopen
DOI
10.5772/intechopen.96627
Keywords
symmetric cipherblock cipherstream ciphertradeoff attackkeystreamkeystream generatorHellman tablerainbow tableone-way functionpreimage
Contact author(s)
orhunkara @ iyte edu tr
History
2021-03-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/319
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/319,
      author = {Orhun Kara},
      title = {Tradeoff attacks on symmetric ciphers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/319},
      year = {2021},
      doi = {10.5772/intechopen.96627},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/319}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/319}
}
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