Paper 2021/297
HashWires: Hyperefficient Credential-Based Range Proofs
Konstantinos Chalkias, Shir Cohen, Kevin Lewi, Fredric Moezinia, and Yolan Romailler
Abstract
This paper presents HashWires, a hash-based range proof protocol that is applicable in settings for which there is a trusted third party (typically a credential issuer) that can generate commitments. We refer to these as "credential-based" range proofs (CBRPs). HashWires improves upon hashchain solutions that are typically restricted to micro-payments for small interval ranges, achieving an exponential speedup in proof generation and verification time. In terms of proof size and computational cost, we show that HashWires compares favorably against Bulletproofs for both 32- and 64-bit numeric values. Although CBRPs are inherently less flexible than general zero-knowledge range proofs, we provide a number of applications in which a credential issuer can leverage HashWires to provide range proofs for private values, without having to rely on heavyweight cryptographic tools and assumptions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS) 2021
- Keywords
- range proofscredentialshash-chainsaccumulatorscryptographic commitmentsmalleabilitymicro-paymentslocation privacy
- Contact author(s)
-
kostascrypto @ fb com
klewi @ fb com - History
- 2021-09-14: last of 2 revisions
- 2021-03-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/297
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/297,
author = {Konstantinos Chalkias and Shir Cohen and Kevin Lewi and Fredric Moezinia and Yolan Romailler},
title = {HashWires: Hyperefficient Credential-Based Range Proofs},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/297},
year = {2021},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/297}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/297}
}
