However, the validation of proposed countermeasures is mostly performed on custom adversary models that are often not tightly coupled with the actual physical behavior of available fault injection mechanisms and techniques and, hence, fail to model the reality accurately. Furthermore, using custom models complicates comparison between different designs and evaluation results. As a consequence, we aim to close this gap by proposing a simple, generic, and consolidated fault injection adversary model in this work that can be perfectly tailored to existing fault injection mechanisms and their physical behavior in hardware. To demonstrate the advantages of our adversary model, we apply it to a cryptographic primitive (i.e., an ASCON S-box) and evaluate it based on different attack vectors. We further show that our proposed adversary model can be used and integrated into the state-of-the-art fault verification tool VerFI. Finally, we provide a discussion on the benefits and differences of our approach compared to already existing evaluation methods and briefly discuss limitations of current available verification tools.
Category / Keywords: FIA, Fault Modeling, Adversary Model, LFI, EMFI, Clock Glitch, Voltage Glitch Date: received 5 Mar 2021 Contact author: jan richter-brockmann at rub de, pascal sasdrich@rub de Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20210307:022857 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2021/296