Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/273

On the (In)Security of the Diffie-Hellman Oblivious PRF with Multiplicative Blinding

Stanislaw Jarecki and Hugo Krawczyk and Jiayu Xu

Abstract: Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) is a protocol between a client holding input x and a server holding key k for a PRF F. At the end, the client learns F_k(x) and nothing else while the server learns nothing. OPRF's have found diverse applications as components of larger protocols, and the currently most efficient instantiation, with security proven in the UC model, is F_k(x)=H2(x,(H1(x))^k) computed using so-called exponential blinding, i.e., the client sends a=(H1(x))^r for random r, the server responds b=a^k, which the client ublinds as v=b^{1/r} to compute F_k(x)=H2(x,v).

However, this protocol requires two variable-base exponentiations on the client, while a more efficient multiplicative blinding scheme replaces one or both client exponentiations with fixed-base exponentiation, leading to the decrease of the client's computational cost by a factor between two to six, depending on pre-computation. We analyze the security of the above OPRF with multiplicative blinding, showing surprising weaknesses that offer attack avenues which are not present using exponential blinding. We characterize the security of this OPRF implementation as a "Revised OPRF" functionality, a relaxation of UC OPRF functionality used in prior work. On the positive side, we show that the Revised OPRF suffices for the security of OPAQUE, the asymmetric PAKE protocol, hence allowing OPAQUE the computational advantages of multiplicative blinding. Unfortunately, we also show examples of other OPRF applications which become insecure when using such blinding. The conclusion is that usage of multiplicative blinding for F_k(x) defined as above, in settings where correct value g^k (needed for multiplicative blinding) is not authenticated, and OPRF inputs are of low entropy, must be carefully analyzed, or avoided all together. We complete the picture by showing a simple and safe alternative definition of function F_k(x) which offers (full) UC OPRF security using either form of blinding.

Category / Keywords: Oblivious PRF, password protocols

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-PKC-2021

Date: received 3 Mar 2021, last revised 6 Mar 2021

Contact author: stanislawjarecki at gmail com,hugokraw@gmail com,jiayux@uci edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This eprint paper is a full version of a paper published in PKC'21. The eprint version contains some proofs and some background information, which were omitted in the conference version for space reasons.

Version: 20210307:025819 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/273


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