Paper 2021/258

Secure Wire Shuffling in the Probing Model

Jean-Sebastien Coron and Lorenzo Spignoli

Abstract

In this paper we describe the first improvement of the wire shuffling countermeasure against side-channel attacks described by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner at Crypto 2003. More precisely, we show how to get worst case statistical security against $t$ probes with running time ${\mathcal O}(t)$ instead of ${\mathcal O}(t \log t)$; our construction is also much simpler. Recall that the classical masking countermeasure achieves perfect security but with running time ${\mathcal O}(t^2)$.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in Crypto 2021
Keywords
Side-channel countermeasurehigh-order maskingprobing model
Contact author(s)
jean-sebastien coron @ uni lu
History
2021-08-21: last of 2 revisions
2021-03-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/258
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/258,
      author = {Jean-Sebastien Coron and Lorenzo Spignoli},
      title = {Secure Wire Shuffling in the Probing Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/258},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/258}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/258}
}
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