Paper 2021/258
Secure Wire Shuffling in the Probing Model
Jean-Sebastien Coron and Lorenzo Spignoli
Abstract
In this paper we describe the first improvement of the wire shuffling countermeasure against side-channel attacks described by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner at Crypto 2003. More precisely, we show how to get worst case statistical security against $t$ probes with running time ${\mathcal O}(t)$ instead of ${\mathcal O}(t \log t)$; our construction is also much simpler. Recall that the classical masking countermeasure achieves perfect security but with running time ${\mathcal O}(t^2)$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2021
- Keywords
- Side-channel countermeasurehigh-order maskingprobing model
- Contact author(s)
- jean-sebastien coron @ uni lu
- History
- 2021-08-21: last of 2 revisions
- 2021-03-03: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/258
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/258,
author = {Jean-Sebastien Coron and Lorenzo Spignoli},
title = {Secure Wire Shuffling in the Probing Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/258},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/258}
}
