Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/258

Secure Shuffling in the Probing Model

Jean-Sebastien Coron and Lorenzo Spignoli

Abstract: In this paper we describe the first improvement of the shuffling countermeasure against side-channel attacks described by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner at Crypto 2003. More precisely, we show how to get worst case statistical security against $t$ probes with running time ${\mathcal O}(t)$ instead of ${\mathcal O}(t \log t)$; our construction is also much simpler. Recall that the classical masking countermeasure achieves perfect security but with running time ${\mathcal O}(t^2)$.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Side-channel countermeasure, high-order masking, probing model

Date: received 3 Mar 2021, last revised 3 Mar 2021

Contact author: jean-sebastien coron at uni lu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210303:194528 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/258


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