Paper 2021/252

A Resource Binding Approach to Logic Obfuscation

Michael Zuzak, Yuntao Liu, and Ankur Srivastava

Abstract

Logic locking has been proposed to counter security threats during IC fabrication. Such an approach restricts unauthorized use by injecting sufficient module level error to derail application level IC functionality. However, recent research has identified a trade-off between the error rate of logic locking and its resilience to a Boolean satisfiablity (SAT) attack. As a result, logic locking often cannot inject sufficient error to impact an IC while maintaining SAT resilience. In this work, we propose using architectural context available during resource binding to co-design architectures and locking configurations capable of high corruption and SAT resilience simultaneously. To do so, we propose 2 security-focused binding/locking algorithms and apply them to bind/lock 11 MediaBench benchmarks. The resulting circuits showed a 26x and 99x increase in the application errors of a fixed locking configuration while maintaining SAT resilience and incurring minimal overhead compared to other binding schemes. Locking applied post-binding could not achieve a high application error rate and SAT resilience simultaneously.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Proceedings of The Design Automation Conference (DAC) 2021
Keywords
Logic LockingResource BindingUntrusted FoundrySupply-Chain Security
Contact author(s)
mzuzak @ umd edu
History
2021-03-02: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/252
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/252,
      author = {Michael Zuzak and Yuntao Liu and Ankur Srivastava},
      title = {A Resource Binding Approach to Logic Obfuscation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/252},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/252}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.