Paper 2021/205

Compact Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Threshold ECDSA with Trustless Setup

Tsz Hon Yuen, Handong Cui, and Xiang Xie

Abstract

Threshold ECDSA signatures provide a higher level of security to a crypto wallet since it requires more than t parties out of n parties to sign a transaction. The state-of-the-art bandwidth efficient threshold ECDSA used the additive homomorphic Castagnos and Laguillaumie (CL) encryption based on an unknown order group G, together with a number of zero-knowledge proofs in G. In this paper, we propose compact zero-knowledge proofs for threshold ECDSA to lower the communication bandwidth, as well as the computation cost. The proposed zero-knowledge proofs include the discrete-logarithm relation in G and the well-formedness of a CL ciphertext. When applied to two-party ECDSA, we can lower the bandwidth of the key generation algorithm by 47%, and the running time for the key generation and signing algorithms are boosted by about 35% and 104% respectively. When applied to threshold ECDSA, our first scheme is more optimized for the key generation algorithm (about 70% lower bandwidth and 70% faster computation in key generation, at a cost of 20% larger bandwidth in signing), while our second scheme has an all-rounded performance improvement (about 60% lower bandwidth, 27% faster computation in key generation without additional cost in signing).

Note: Correct some typos and minor corrections in the probability analysis in the proof of Thm 2 and 4.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in PKC 2021
Keywords
Threshold signatureECDSAZero-knowledge Proof
Contact author(s)
thyuen @ cs hku hk
History
2021-07-22: revised
2021-03-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/205
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/205,
      author = {Tsz Hon Yuen and Handong Cui and Xiang Xie},
      title = {Compact Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Threshold {ECDSA} with Trustless Setup},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/205},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/205}
}
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