Paper 2021/170
Fully Anonymous Group Signature with Verifier-Local Revocation
Ai Kitagawa, Yusuke Sakai, Keita Emura, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Keisuke Tanaka
Abstract
Group signature with verifier-local revocation (VLR-GS) is a special type of revocable group sig- nature which enables a user to sign messages without referring to information regarding revoked users. Although there have been several proposals of VLR-GS schemes since the first scheme proposed by Boneh and Shacham [CCS 2004], all of these schemes only achieve a security notion called selfless anonymity, which is strictly weaker than the de facto standard security notion, full anonymity. Thus, for more than a decade, it has been an open problem whether a fully anonymous VLR-GS scheme can be achieved. In this paper, we give an affirmative answer to this problem. Concretely, we show the construction of a fully anonymous VLR-GS scheme from a digital signature scheme, a key-private public key encryption scheme, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. Also, we show that backward unlinkability, which ensures that even after a user is revoked, signatures produced by the user before the revocation remain anonymous, can be realized without additional building blocks. Although the size of group public key and signing key depend on the number of time periods, finally, we show that the size of these keys can be reduced by employing an identity-based encryption scheme.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. SCN 2018
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-98113-0_2
- Keywords
- Group SignatureVerifier-Local RevocationFull AnonymityBackward Unlinkability
- Contact author(s)
- a kitagawa @ aist go jp
- History
- 2021-02-17: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/170
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/170, author = {Ai Kitagawa and Yusuke Sakai and Keita Emura and Goichiro Hanaoka and Keisuke Tanaka}, title = {Fully Anonymous Group Signature with Verifier-Local Revocation}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/170}, year = {2021}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-98113-0_2}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/170} }