Paper 2021/1663

Cryptography from Pseudorandom Quantum States

Prabhanjan Ananth, Luowen Qian, and Henry Yuen

Abstract

Pseudorandom states, introduced by Ji, Liu and Song (Crypto'18), are efficiently-computable quantum states that are computationally indistinguishable from Haar-random states. One-way functions imply the existence of pseudorandom states, but Kretschmer (TQC'20) recently constructed an oracle relative to which there are no one-way functions but pseudorandom states still exist. Motivated by this, we study the intriguing possibility of basing interesting cryptographic tasks on pseudorandom states. We construct, assuming the existence of pseudorandom state generators that map a $\lambda$-bit seed to a $\omega(\log\lambda)$-qubit state, (a) statistically binding and computationally hiding commitments and (b) pseudo one-time encryption schemes. A consequence of (a) is that pseudorandom states are sufficient to construct maliciously secure multiparty computation protocols in the dishonest majority setting. Our constructions are derived via a new notion called {\em pseudorandom function-like states} (PRFS), a generalization of pseudorandom states that parallels the classical notion of pseudorandom functions. Beyond the above two applications, we believe our notion can effectively replace pseudorandom functions in many other cryptographic applications.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
quantum cryptography
Contact author(s)
prabhanjan @ cs ucsb edu
luowenq @ bu edu
hyuen @ cs columbia edu
History
2022-03-14: revised
2021-12-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/1663
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1663,
      author = {Prabhanjan Ananth and Luowen Qian and Henry Yuen},
      title = {Cryptography from Pseudorandom Quantum States},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1663},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1663}
}
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