Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1596

SHealS and HealS: isogeny-based PKEs from akey validation method for SIDH

Tako Boris Fouotsa and Christophe Petit

Abstract: In 2016, Galbraith et al. presented an adaptive attack on the SIDH key exchange protocol. In SIKE, one applies a variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform to force Bob to reveal his encryption key to Alice, which Alice then uses to re-encrypt Bob's ciphertext and verify its validity. Therefore, Bob can not reuse his encryption keys. There have been two other proposed countermeasures enabling static-static private keys: k-SIDH and its variant by Jao and Urbanik. These countermeasures are relatively expensive since they consist in running multiple parallel instances of SIDH.

In this paper, firstly, we propose a new countermeasure to the GPST adaptive attack on SIDH. Our countermeasure does not require key disclosure as in SIKE, nor multiple parallel instances as in k-SIDH. We translate our countermeasure into a key validation method for SIDH-type schemes. Secondly, we use our key validation to design HealSIDH, an efficient SIDH-type static-static key interactive exchange protocol. Thirdly, we derive a PKE scheme SHealS using HealSIDH. SHealS uses larger primes compared to SIKE, has larger keys and ciphertexts, but only $4$ isogenies are computed in a full execution of the scheme, as opposed to $5$ isogenies in SIKE. We prove that SHealS is IND-CPA secure relying on a new assumption we introduce and we conjecture its IND-CCA security. We suggest HealS, a variant of SHealS using a smaller prime, providing smaller keys and ciphertexts.

As a result, HealSIDH is a practically efficient SIDH based (interactive) key exchange incorporating a "direct" countermeasure to the GPST adaptive attack.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Post-quantum cryptography, SIDH, SIKE, adaptive attacks, HealSIDH, SHealS, HealS

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-ASIACRYPT-2021

Date: received 5 Dec 2021

Contact author: takoboris fouotsa at uniroma3 it, christophe f petit at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20211206:035721 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1596


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