Paper 2021/159

hbACSS: How to Robustly Share Many Secrets

Thomas Yurek, Licheng Luo, Jaiden Fairoze, Aniket Kate, and Andrew Miller

Abstract

Despite significant recent progress toward making multi-party computation (MPC) practical, no existing MPC library offers complete robustness---meaning guaranteed output delivery, including in the offline phase---in a network that even has intermittent delays. Importantly, several theoretical MPC constructions already ensure robustness in this setting. We observe that the key reason for this gap between theory and practice is the absence of efficient verifiable/complete secret sharing (VSS/CSS) constructions; existing CSS protocols either require a) challenging broadcast channels in practice or b) introducing computation and communication overhead that is at least quadratic in the number of players. This work presents hbACSS, a suite of optimal-resilience asynchronous complete secret sharing protocols that are (quasi)linear in both computation and communication overhead. Towards developing hbACSS, we develop hbPolyCommit, an efficient polynomial commitment scheme that is (quasi)linear (in the polynomial degree) in terms of computation and communication overhead without requiring a trusted setup. We implement our hbACSS protocols, extensively analyze their practicality, and observe that our protocols scale well with an increasing number of parties. In particular, we use hbACSS to generate MPC input masks: a useful primitive which had previously only been calculated nonrobustly in practice.

Note: NDSS version of the paper with the full hbACSS2 protocol specification appended to the end

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision.NDSS
DOI
10.14722/ndss.2022.23120
Keywords
multiparty computationverifiable secret sharingasynchronous verifiable secret sharing
Contact author(s)
yurek2 @ illinois edu
ll6 @ illinois edu
jfairoze @ student unimelb edu au
aniket @ purdue edu
soc1024 @ illinois edu
History
2022-02-08: revised
2021-02-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/159
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/159,
      author = {Thomas Yurek and Licheng Luo and Jaiden Fairoze and Aniket Kate and Andrew Miller},
      title = {hbACSS: How to Robustly Share Many Secrets},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/159},
      year = {2021},
      doi = {10.14722/ndss.2022.23120},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/159}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/159}
}
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