Paper 2021/1562
Concurrently Composable Non-Interactive Secure Computation
Abstract
We consider the feasibility of non-interactive secure two-party computation (NISC) in the plain model satisfying the notion of superpolynomial-time simulation (SPS). While stand-alone secure SPS-NISC protocols are known from standard assumptions (Badrinarayanan et al., Asiacrypt 2017), it has remained an open problem to construct a concurrently composable SPS-NISC. Prior to our work, the best protocols require 5 rounds (Garg et al., Eurocrypt 2017), or 3 simultaneous-message rounds (Badrinarayanan et al., TCC 2017). In this work, we demonstrate the first concurrently composable SPS-NISC. Our construction assumes the existence of: - a non-interactive (weakly) CCA-secure commitment, - a stand-alone secure SPS-NISC with subexponential security, and satisfies the notion of "angel-based" UC security (i.e., UC with a superpolynomial-time helper) with perfect correctness. We additionally demonstrate that both of the primitives we use (albeit only with polynomial security) are necessary for such concurrently composable SPS-NISC with perfect correctness. As such, our work identifies essentially necessary and sufficient primitives for concurrently composable SPS-NISC with perfect correctness in the plain model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2022
- Keywords
- secure computation two-party computation non-interactive composable concurrent security UC security
- Contact author(s)
- asmorgan @ cs cornell edu
- History
- 2022-11-27: revised
- 2021-11-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1562
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1562,
author = {Andrew Morgan and Rafael Pass},
title = {Concurrently Composable Non-Interactive Secure Computation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1562},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1562}
}
