Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/156

Mechanized Proofs of Adversarial Complexity and Application to Universal Composability

Manuel Barbosa and Gilles Barthe and Benjamin Grégoire and Adrien Koutsos and Pierre-Yves Strub

Abstract: EasyCrypt is a proof assistant used for verifying computational security proofs of cryptographic constructions. It has been applied to several prominent examples, including the SHA3 standard and a critical component of AWS Key Management Services. In this paper we enhance the EasyCrypt proof assistant to reason about computational complexity of adversaries. The key technical tool is a Hoare logic for reasoning about computational complexity (execution time and oracle calls) of adversarial computations. Our Hoare logic is built on top of the module system used by EasyCrypt for modeling adversaries. We prove that our logic is sound w.r.t. the semantics of EasyCrypt programs --- we also provide full semantics for the EasyCrypt module system, which was previously lacking. We showcase (for the first time in EasyCrypt and in other computer-aided cryptographic tools) how our approach can express precise relationships between the probability of adversarial success and their execution time. In particular, we can quantify existentially over adversaries in a complexity class, and express general composition statements in simulation-based frameworks. Moreover, such statements can be composed to derive standard concrete security bounds for cryptographic constructions whose security is proved in a modular way. As a main benefit of our approach, we revisit security proofs of some well-known cryptographic constructions and we present a new formalization of Universal Composability (UC).

Category / Keywords: foundations / Verification of Cryptographic Primitives, Formal Methods, Interactive Proof System, Complexity Analysis

Date: received 12 Feb 2021

Contact author: adrien koutsos at inria fr, gjbarthe@gmail com, mbb@fc up pt, benjamin gregoire@inria fr, pierre-yves@strub nu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210217:100233 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/156


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]