Paper 2021/1558
RSA Key Recovery from Digit Equivalence Information
Abstract
The seminal work of Heninger and Shacham (Crypto 2009) demonstrated a method for reconstructing secret RSA keys from artial information of the key components. In this paper we further investigate this approach but apply it to a different context that appears in some side-channel attacks. We assume a fixed-window exponentiation algorithm that leaks the equivalence between digits, without leaking the value of the digits themselves. We explain how to exploit the side-channel information with the Heninger-Shacham algorithm. To analyse the complexity of the approach, we model the attack as a Markov process and experimentally validate the accuracy of the model. Our model shows that the attack is feasible in the commonly used case where the window size is 5.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. ACNS 2022
- Keywords
- RSA side channel partial information
- Contact author(s)
-
chitchanok chuengsatiansup @ adelaide edu au
rui sim @ adelaide edu au
yval @ cs adelaide edu au - History
- 2022-06-05: revised
- 2021-11-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1558
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1558,
author = {Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup and Andrew Feutrill and Rui Qi Sim and Yuval Yarom},
title = {RSA Key Recovery from Digit Equivalence Information},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/1558},
year = {2021},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1558}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1558}
}
