Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1542

An End-to-End Bitstream Tamper Attack Against Flip-Chip FPGAs

Fahim Rahman and Farimah Farahmandi and Mark Tehranipoor

Abstract: FPGA bitstream encryption and authentication can be defeated by various techniques and it is critical to understand how these vulnerabilities enable extraction and tampering of commercial FPGA bitstreams. We exploit the physical vulnerability of bitstream encryption keys to readout using failure analysis equipment and conduct an end-to-end bitstream tamper attack. Our work underscores the feasibility of supply chain bitstream tampering and the necessity of guarding against such attacks in critical systems.

Category / Keywords: applications / Security, Tampering, Bitstream, FPGA

Date: received 22 Nov 2021

Contact author: fahimrahman at ece ufl edu, farimah at ece ufl edu, tehranipoor at ece ufl edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20211123:142606 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1542


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