Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1510

Pattern Devoid Cryptography

Gideon Samid

Abstract: Pattern loaded ciphers are at risk of being compromised by exploiting deeper patterns discovered first by the attacker. This reality offers a built-in advantage to prime cryptanalysis institutions. On the flip side, risk of hidden math and faster computing undermines confidence in the prevailing cipher products. To avoid this risk one would resort to building security on the premise of lavish quantities of randomness. Gilbert S. Vernam did it in 1917. Using modern technology, the same idea of randomness-based security can be implemented without the inconvenience associated with the old Vernam cipher. These are Trans Vernam Ciphers that project security through a pattern-devoid cipher. Having no pattern to lean on, there is no pattern to crack. The attacker faces (i) a properly randomized shared cryptographic key combined with (ii) unilateral randomness, originated ad-hoc by the transmitter without pre-coordination with the recipient. The unlimited unilateral randomness together with the shared key randomness is set to project as much security as desired up to and including Vernam levels. Assorted Trans Vernam ciphers (TVC) are categorized and reviewed, presenting a cogent message in favor of a cryptographic pathway where transmitted secrets are credibly secured against attackers with faster computers and better mathematicians. A vision emerges: a cryptographic level playing field, consistent with the emerging culture of Web 3.0.

Category / Keywords: foundations / randomness, brute-force attack, complexity, Vernam, Mathematical Secrecy

Date: received 14 Nov 2021

Contact author: Gideon Samid at CASE edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This is a review article presenting a variety of ciphers based on lavish use of secret measure of randomness to project target security.

Version: 20211120:224557 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1510


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