Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1509

More Lessons: Analysis of PUF-based Authentication Protocols for IoT

Karim Lounis and Mohammad Zulkernine

Abstract: Authentication constitutes the foundation and vertebrae of all security properties. It is the procedure in which communicating parties prove their identities to each other, and generally establish and derive secret keys to enforce other services, such as confidentiality, data integrity, non-repudiation, and availability. PUFs (Physical Unclonable Functions) has been the subject of many subsequent publications on lightweight, lowcost, and secure-by-design authentication protocols. This has turned our attention to investigate the most recent PUF-based authentication protocols for IoT. In [1], we reviewed the security of some PUF-based authentication protocols that were proposed between 2016 and October 2020, and drew important security lessons to consider by future authentication protocol designers. In this paper, we extend our previous work by reviewing the security of fifteen PUF-based authentication protocols that were recently published during the past two years (2020 and 2021). We first provide the necessary background on PUFs and how they are used for authentication. Then, we analyze the security of these authentication protocols to identify and report common security issues and design flaws. We draw lessons and recommendations for future authentication protocol designers

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), PUFbased authentication, PUF security, and PUF attacks

Date: received 14 Nov 2021

Contact author: karim lounis at queensu ca

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20211115:130016 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1509


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