Paper 2021/1471

Efficient Searchable Symmetric Encryption for Join Queries

Charanjit Jutla and Sikhar Patranabis

Abstract

The Oblivious Cross-Tags (OXT) protocol due to Cash et al. (CRYPTO'13) is a highly scalable searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme that allows fast processing of conjunctive and more general Boolean queries over encrypted relational databases. A longstanding open question has been to extend OXT to also support queries over joins of tables without pre-computing the joins. In this paper, we solve this open question without compromising on the nice properties of OXT with respect to both security and efficiency. We propose Join Cross-Tags (JXT) - a purely symmetric-key solution that supports efficient conjunctive queries over (equi) joins of encrypted tables without any pre-computation at setup. JXT is fully compatible with OXT, and can be used in conjunction with OXT to support a wide class of SQL queries directly over encrypted relational databases. We prove the (adaptive) simulation-based security of JXT with respect to a rigorously defined leakage profile.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
Relational DatabasesEncrypted DatabasesSQL QueriesLeakagePseudorandom Function
Contact author(s)
csjutla @ us ibm com
sikharpatranabis @ gmail com
History
2021-11-06: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/1471
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1471,
      author = {Charanjit Jutla and Sikhar Patranabis},
      title = {Efficient Searchable Symmetric Encryption for Join Queries},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/1471},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1471}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1471}
}
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