Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1452

A Lightweight Implementation of Saber Resistant Against Side-Channel Attacks

Abubakr Abdulgadir and Kamyar Mohajerani and Viet Ba Dang and Jens-Peter Kaps and Kris Gaj

Abstract: The field of post-quantum cryptography aims to develop and analyze algorithms that can withstand classical and quantum cryptanalysis. The NIST PQC standardization process, now in its third round, specifies ease of protection against side-channel analysis as an important selection criterion. In this work, we develop and validate a masked hardware implementation of Saber key encapsulation mechanism, a third-round NIST PQC finalist. We first design a baseline lightweight hardware architecture of Saber and then apply side-channel countermeasures. Our protected hardware implementation is significantly faster than previously reported protected software and software/hardware co-design implementations. Additionally, applying side-channel countermeasures to our baseline design incurs approximately 2.9x and 1.4x penalty in terms of the number of LUTs and latency, respectively, in modern FPGAs.

Category / Keywords: implementation / public-key cryptography, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Key Encapsulation Mechanism, hardware implementations, Side-Channel Analysis, FPGA

Original Publication (with minor differences): To appear in the proceedings of Indocrypt 2021

Date: received 28 Oct 2021

Contact author: aabdulga at gmu edu, mmohajer at gmu edu, vdang6 at gmu edu, jkaps at gmu edu, kgaj at gmu edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20211029:183128 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1452


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