Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1420

Extending the Tally-Hiding Ordinos System: Implementations for Borda, Hare-Niemeyer, Condorcet, and Instant-Runoff Voting

Fabian Hertel and Nicolas Huber and Jonas Kittelberger and Ralf Kuesters and Julian Liedtke and Daniel Rausch

Abstract: Modern electronic voting systems (e-voting systems) are designed to achieve a variety of security properties, such as verifiability, accountability, and vote privacy. Some of these systems aim at so-called tally-hiding: they compute the election result, according to some result function, like the winner of the election, without revealing any other information to any party. In particular, if desired, they neither reveal the full tally consisting of all (aggregated or even individual) votes nor parts of it, except for the election result, according to the result function. Tally-hiding systems offer many attractive features, such as strong privacy guarantees both for voters and for candidates, and protection against Italian attacks. The Ordinos system is a recent provably secure framework for accountable tally-hiding e-voting that extends Helios and can be instantiated for various election methods and election result functions. So far, practical instantiations and implementations for only rather simple result functions (e.g., computing the $k$ best candidates) and single/multi-vote elections have been developed for Ordinos.

In this paper, we propose and implement several new Ordinos instantiations in order to support Borda voting, the Hare-Niemeyer method for proportional representation, multiple Condorcet methods, and Instant-Runoff Voting. Our instantiations, which are based on suitable secure multi-party computation (MPC) components, offer the first tally-hiding implementations for these voting methods. To evaluate the practicality of our MPC components and the resulting e-voting systems, we provide extensive benchmarks for all our implementations.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / electronic voting, multi-party computation, verifiability, privacy, accountability

Original Publication (in the same form): Sixth International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting (E-Vote-ID 2021)

Date: received 21 Oct 2021

Contact author: julian liedtke at sec uni-stuttgart de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20211024:073639 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1420


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]