Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1404

Non-interactive Distributional Indistinguishability (NIDI) and Non-Malleable Commitments

Dakshita Khurana

Abstract: We introduce non-interactive distributionally indistinguishable arguments (NIDI) to address a significant weakness of NIWI proofs: namely, the lack of meaningful secrecy when proving statements about $\mathsf{NP}$ languages with unique witnesses.

NIDI arguments allow a prover P to send a single message to verifier V, given which V obtains a sample d from a (secret) distribution D, together with a proof of membership of d in an NP language L. The soundness guarantee is that if the sample d obtained by the verifier V is not in L, then V outputs $\bot$. The privacy guarantee is that secrets about the distribution remain hidden: for every pair of distributions $D_0$ and $D_1$ of instance-witness pairs in L such that instances sampled according to $D_0$ or $D_1$ are (sufficiently) hard-to-distinguish, a NIDI that outputs instances according to $D_0$ with proofs of membership in L is indistinguishable from one that outputs instances according to $D_1$ with proofs of membership in L.

- We build NIDI arguments for sufficiently hard-to-distinguish distributions assuming sub-exponential indistinguishability obfuscation and sub-exponential one-way functions.

- We demonstrate preliminary applications of NIDI and of our techniques to obtaining the first (relaxed) non-interactive constructions in the plain model, from well-founded assumptions, of:

1. Commit-and-prove that provably hides the committed message

2. CCA-secure commitments against non-uniform adversaries.

The commit phase of our commitment schemes consists of a single message from the committer to the receiver, followed by a randomized output by the receiver (that need not necessarily be returned to the committer).

Category / Keywords: foundations / zero knowledge

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-EUROCRYPT-2021

Date: received 18 Oct 2021

Contact author: dakshita at illinois edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Full version of the Eurocrypt 2021 paper.

Version: 20211018:061731 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1404


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