Paper 2021/1403
Efficient Adaptively-Secure Byzantine Agreement for Long Messages
Abstract
We investigate the communication complexity of Byzantine agreement protocols for long messages against an adaptive adversary. In this setting, prior results either achieved a communication complexity of $O(nl\cdot\poly(\kappa))$ or $O(nl + n^2 \cdot \poly(\kappa))$ for $l$-bit long messages. We improve the state of the art by presenting protocols with communication complexity $O(nl + n \cdot \poly(\kappa))$ in both the synchronous and asynchronous communication models. The synchronous protocol tolerates $t \le (1-\epsilon) \frac{n}{2}$ corruptions and assumes a VRF setup, while the asynchronous protocol tolerates $t \le (1-\epsilon) \frac{n}{3}$ corruptions under further cryptographic assumptions. Our protocols are very simple and combine subcommittee election with the recent approach of Nayak et al. (DISC `20). Surprisingly, the analysis of our protocols is 'all but simple' and involves an interesting new application of Mc Diarmid's inequality to obtain 'optimal' corruption thresholds.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Byzantine agreement blockchain communication complexity
- Contact author(s)
-
amey bhangale @ ucr edu
cliuzhan @ andrew cmu edu
lossjulian @ gmail com
kartik @ cs duke edu - History
- 2022-06-06: revised
- 2021-10-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1403
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1403, author = {Amey Bhangale and Chen-Da Liu-Zhang and Julian Loss and Kartik Nayak}, title = {Efficient Adaptively-Secure Byzantine Agreement for Long Messages}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1403}, year = {2021}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1403} }