Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1366

Group Signatures and More from Isogenies and Lattices: Generic, Simple, and Efficient

Ward Beullens and Samuel Dobson and Shuichi Katsumata and Yi-Fu Lai and Federico Pintore

Abstract: We construct an efficient dynamic group signature (or more generally an accountable ring signature) from isogeny and lattice assumptions. Our group signature is based on a simple generic construction that can be instantiated by cryptographically hard group actions such as the CSIDH group action or an MLWE-based group action. The signature is of size $O(\log N)$, where $N$ is the number of users in the group. Our idea builds on the recent efficient OR-proof by Beullens, Katsumata, and Pintore (Asiacrypt'20), where we efficiently add a proof of valid ciphertext to their OR-proof and further show that the resulting non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system is online extractable.

Our group signatures satisfy more ideal security properties compared to previously known constructions, while simultaneously having an attractive signature size. The signature size of our isogeny-based construction is an order of magnitude smaller than all previously known post-quantum group signatures (e.g., 6.6 KB for 64 members). In comparison, our lattice-based construction has a larger signature size (e.g., either 126 KB or 89 KB for 64 members depending on the satisfied security property). However, since the $O(\cdot)$-notation hides a very small constant factor, it remains small even for very large group sizes, say $2^{20}$.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Isogeny-based cryptography, Lattice-based cryptography, Post-Quantum cryptography, Accountable Ring Signature, Group Signature

Date: received 10 Oct 2021, last revised 28 Oct 2021

Contact author: ward beullens at esat kuleuven be, samuel dobson nz at gmail com, shuichi katsumata at aist go jp, ylai276 at aucklanduni ac nz, federico pintore at uniba it

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Updated (Oct.28, 2021): Updated the references.

Version: 20211028:094500 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]