Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1365

Collusion Resistant Revocable Ring Signatures and Group Signatures from Hard Homogeneous Spaces

Yi-Fu Lai and Samuel Dobson

Abstract: Both ring signatures and group signatures are useful privacy tools, allowing signers to hide their identities within a set of other public keys, while allowing their signatures to be validated with respect to the entire set. Group signature schemes and revocable ring signature schemes both provide the additional ability for certain authorized members to revoke the anonymity on a signature and reveal the true signer—allowing management of abuse in the scheme. This work consists of two parts. Firstly, we introduce a stronger security notion—collusion resistance—for revocable ring signatures and show how to derive a group signature scheme from it, which provides a new approach to obtaining group signatures. This improves on the existing weak security model (e.g. with selfless anonymity) which fails to guarantee anonymity of members whose keys are exposed. Our stronger notion requires that the scheme remains secure against full key exposure in the anonymity game, and allows collusion among arbitrary members in the revocability game. Secondly (and more concretely), we construct a practical collusion-resistant revocable ring signature scheme based on hard homogenous spaces (HHS), and thus obtain a group signature scheme based on isogenies. To the best of our knowledge, the schemes given in this work are the first efficient post-quantum (collusion-resistant) revocable ring signature scheme, and the first efficient isogeny-based group signature scheme in the literature.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / group signature, isogeny cryptography, ring signature, post-quantum cryptography

Date: received 10 Oct 2021, last revised 20 Oct 2021

Contact author: ylai276 at aucklanduni ac nz, samuel dobson nz at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: 20 Oct: Add a comparison table and fix typos in security notions

Version: 20211020:015526 (All versions of this report)

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