Paper 2021/1339

Safe-Error Analysis of Post-Quantum Cryptography Mechanisms

Luk Bettale, Simon Montoya, and Guénaël Renault

Abstract

The NIST selection process for standardizing Post-Quantum Cryptography Mechanisms is currently running. Many papers already studied their theoretical security, but the resistance in deployed device has not been much investigated so far. In particular, fault attack is a serious threat for algorithms implemented in embedded devices. One particularly powerful technique is to use safe-error attacks. Such attacks exploit the fact that a specific fault may or may not lead to a faulty output depending on a secret value. In this paper, we investigate the resistance of various Post-Quantum candidates algorithms against such attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision.FDTC 2021 - Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptographie, Sep 2021, Virtual event, France
Keywords
fault attackssafe-errorpost-quantum cryptography
Contact author(s)
simon montoya @ idemia com
History
2021-10-05: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/1339
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1339,
      author = {Luk Bettale and Simon Montoya and Guénaël Renault},
      title = {Safe-Error Analysis of Post-Quantum Cryptography Mechanisms},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/1339},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1339}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1339}
}
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