Paper 2021/1339
Safe-Error Analysis of Post-Quantum Cryptography Mechanisms
Luk Bettale, Simon Montoya, and Guénaël Renault
Abstract
The NIST selection process for standardizing Post-Quantum Cryptography Mechanisms is currently running. Many papers already studied their theoretical security, but the resistance in deployed device has not been much investigated so far. In particular, fault attack is a serious threat for algorithms implemented in embedded devices. One particularly powerful technique is to use safe-error attacks. Such attacks exploit the fact that a specific fault may or may not lead to a faulty output depending on a secret value. In this paper, we investigate the resistance of various Post-Quantum candidates algorithms against such attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. FDTC 2021 - Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptographie, Sep 2021, Virtual event, France
- Keywords
- fault attackssafe-errorpost-quantum cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- simon montoya @ idemia com
- History
- 2021-10-05: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1339
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1339,
author = {Luk Bettale and Simon Montoya and Guénaël Renault},
title = {Safe-Error Analysis of Post-Quantum Cryptography Mechanisms},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/1339},
year = {2021},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1339}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1339}
}
