Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1313

Hybrid Memristor-CMOS Obfuscation Against Untrusted Foundries

Amin Rezaei and Jie Gu and Hai Zhou

Abstract: The high cost of IC design has made chip protection one of the first priorities of the semiconductor industry. In addition, with the growing number of untrusted foundries, the possibility of inside foundry attack is escalating. However, by taking advantage of polymorphic gates, the layouts of the circuits with different functionalities look exactly identical, making it impossible even for an inside foundry attacker to distinguish the defined functionality of an IC by looking at its layout. Moreover, since memristor is compatible with CMOS structure, it is possible to efficiently design hybrid memristor- CMOS circuits. In this paper, we propose a hardware obfuscation method based on polymorphic hybrid memristor-CMOS technology. Overhead of the polymorphic designs and the time complexity of possible attacks are discussed.

Category / Keywords: applications / Hardware Obfuscation, Polymorphic Gates, Memristor, Inside Foundry Attack

Original Publication (in the same form): 2019 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)
DOI:
10.1109/ISVLSI.2019.00102

Date: received 28 Sep 2021

Contact author: me at aminrezaei com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210928:184700 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1313


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