Paper 2021/1313
Hybrid Memristor-CMOS Obfuscation Against Untrusted Foundries
Amin Rezaei, Jie Gu, and Hai Zhou
Abstract
The high cost of IC design has made chip protection one of the first priorities of the semiconductor industry. In addition, with the growing number of untrusted foundries, the possibility of inside foundry attack is escalating. However, by taking advantage of polymorphic gates, the layouts of the circuits with different functionalities look exactly identical, making it impossible even for an inside foundry attacker to distinguish the defined functionality of an IC by looking at its layout. Moreover, since memristor is compatible with CMOS structure, it is possible to efficiently design hybrid memristor- CMOS circuits. In this paper, we propose a hardware obfuscation method based on polymorphic hybrid memristor-CMOS technology. Overhead of the polymorphic designs and the time complexity of possible attacks are discussed.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. 2019 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)
- DOI
- 10.1109/ISVLSI.2019.00102
- Keywords
- Hardware ObfuscationPolymorphic GatesMemristorInside Foundry Attack
- Contact author(s)
- me @ aminrezaei com
- History
- 2021-09-28: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1313
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1313,
author = {Amin Rezaei and Jie Gu and Hai Zhou},
title = {Hybrid Memristor-{CMOS} Obfuscation Against Untrusted Foundries},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1313},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1109/ISVLSI.2019.00102},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1313}
}
