Paper 2021/1291

MyOPE: Malicious securitY for Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation

Malika Izabachène, Cosmian
Anca Nitulescu, Protocol Labs
Paola de Perthuis, Cosmian, DIENS, École Normale Supérieure, CNRS, Inria, PSL University
David Pointcheval, DIENS, École Normale Supérieure, CNRS, Inria, PSL University
Abstract

Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE) schemes are interactive protocols between a sender with a private polynomial and a receiver with a private evaluation point where the receiver learns the evaluation of the polynomial in their point and no additional information. In this work, we introduce MyOPE, a ``short-sighted'' non-interactive polynomial evaluation scheme with a poly-logarithmic communication complexity in the presence of malicious senders. In addition to strong privacy guarantees, MyOPE enforces honest sender behavior and consistency by adding verifiability to the calculations. The main building block for this new verifiable OPE is an inner product argument (IPA) over rings that guarantees an inner product relation holds between committed vectors. Our IPA works for vectors with elements from generic rings of polynomials and has constant-size proofs that consist in one commitment only while the verification, once the validity of the vector-commitments has been checked, consists is one quadratic equation only. We further demonstrate the applications of our IPA for verifiable OPE using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) over rings of polynomials: we prove the correctness of an inner product between the vector of powers of the evaluation point and the vector of polynomial coefficients, along with other inner-products necessary in this application's proof. MyOPE builds on generic secure encoding techniques for succinct commitments, that allow real-world FHE parameters and Residue Number System (RNS) optimizations, suitable for high-degree polynomials.

Note: full version of the conference paper

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. SCN 2022
Keywords
SNARK Verifiable Computations FHE PSI OPE Malicious Security Inner-Product Argument
Contact author(s)
malika izabachene @ cosmian com
anca @ protocol ai
paola de perthuis @ ens fr
david pointcheval @ ens fr
History
2022-07-06: last of 4 revisions
2021-09-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/1291
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1291,
      author = {Malika Izabachène and Anca Nitulescu and Paola de Perthuis and David Pointcheval},
      title = {{MyOPE}: Malicious {securitY} for Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1291},
      year = {2021},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1291}
}
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