Paper 2021/1253

EasyPQC: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography

Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Xiong Fan, Benjamin Grégoire, Shih-Han Hung, Jonathan Katz, Pierre-Yves Strub, Xiaodi Wu, and Li Zhou

Abstract

EasyCrypt is a formal verification tool used extensively for formalizing concrete security proofs of cryptographic constructions. However, the EasyCrypt formal logics consider only classical attackers, which means that post-quantum security proofs cannot be formalized and machine-checked with this tool. In this paper we prove that a natural extension of the EasyCrypt core logics permits capturing a wide class of post-quantum cryptography proofs, settling a question raised by (Unruh, POPL 2019). Leveraging our positive result, we implement EasyPQC, an extension of EasyCrypt for post-quantum security proofs, and use EasyPQC to verify post-quantum security of three classic constructions: PRF-based MAC, Full Domain Hash and GPV08 identity-based encryption.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision.ACM CCS 2021
DOI
10.1145/3460120.3484567
Keywords
Formal verificationpost-quantum cryptography
Contact author(s)
leofanxiong @ gmail com
History
2021-09-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/1253
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1253,
      author = {Manuel Barbosa and Gilles Barthe and Xiong Fan and Benjamin Grégoire and Shih-Han Hung and Jonathan Katz and Pierre-Yves Strub and Xiaodi Wu and Li Zhou},
      title = {EasyPQC: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/1253},
      year = {2021},
      doi = {10.1145/3460120.3484567},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1253}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1253}
}
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