Paper 2021/1253
EasyPQC: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography
Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Xiong Fan, Benjamin Grégoire, Shih-Han Hung, Jonathan Katz, Pierre-Yves Strub, Xiaodi Wu, and Li Zhou
Abstract
EasyCrypt is a formal verification tool used extensively for formalizing concrete security proofs of cryptographic constructions. However, the EasyCrypt formal logics consider only classical attackers, which means that post-quantum security proofs cannot be formalized and machine-checked with this tool. In this paper we prove that a natural extension of the EasyCrypt core logics permits capturing a wide class of post-quantum cryptography proofs, settling a question raised by (Unruh, POPL 2019). Leveraging our positive result, we implement EasyPQC, an extension of EasyCrypt for post-quantum security proofs, and use EasyPQC to verify post-quantum security of three classic constructions: PRF-based MAC, Full Domain Hash and GPV08 identity-based encryption.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. ACM CCS 2021
- DOI
- 10.1145/3460120.3484567
- Keywords
- Formal verificationpost-quantum cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- leofanxiong @ gmail com
- History
- 2021-09-21: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1253
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1253,
author = {Manuel Barbosa and Gilles Barthe and Xiong Fan and Benjamin Grégoire and Shih-Han Hung and Jonathan Katz and Pierre-Yves Strub and Xiaodi Wu and Li Zhou},
title = {{EasyPQC}: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1253},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1145/3460120.3484567},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1253}
}
