Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1235

Saidoyoki: Evaluating side-channel leakage in pre- and post-silicon setting

Pantea Kiaei with Zhenyuan Liu with Ramazan Kaan Eren with Yuan Yao with Patrick Schaumont

Abstract: Predicting the level and exploitability of side-channel leakage from complex SoC design is a challenging task. We present Saidoyoki, a test platform that enables the assessment of side-channel leakage under two different settings. The first is pre-silicon side-channel leakage estimation in SoC, and it requires the use of fast side-channel leakage estimation from a high level design description. The second is post-silicon side-channel leakage measurement and analysis in SoC, and it requires a hardware prototype that reflects the design description. By designing an in-house SoC and next building a side-channel leakage analysis environment around it, we are able to evaluate design-time (pre-silicon) side-channel leakage estimates as well as prototype (post-silicon) side-channel leakage measurements. The Saidoyoki platform hosts two different SoC, one based on a 32-bit RISC-V processor and a second based on a SPARC V8 processor. In this contribution, we highlight our design decisions and design flow for side-channel leakage simulation and measurement, and we present preliminary results and analysis using the Saidoyoki platform. We highlight that, while the post-silicon setting provides more side-channel leakage detail than the pre-silicon setting, the latter provides significantly enhanced test resolution and root cause analysis support. We conclude that pre-silicon side-channel leakage assessment can be an important tool for the security analysis of modern Security SoC.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Side-channel Leakage Verification, Secure IC Design, Hardware Security

Original Publication (in the same form): 34th IEEE International System-on-Chip Conference (IEEE SOCC)

Date: received 17 Sep 2021

Contact author: pkiaei at wpi edu, zliu12 at wpi edu, reren at wpi edu, yuan9 at vt edu, pschaumont at wpi edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210920:114529 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1235


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