Paper 2021/1230

Two-Round Maliciously Secure Computation with Super-Polynomial Simulation

Amit Agarwal, James Bartusek, Vipul Goyal, Dakshita Khurana, and Giulio Malavolta


We propose the first maliciously secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol for general functionalities in two rounds, without any trusted setup. Since polynomial-time simulation is impossible in two rounds, we achieve the relaxed notion of superpolynomial-time simulation security [Pass, EUROCRYPT 2003]. Prior to our work, no such maliciously secure protocols were known even in the two-party setting for functionalities where both parties receive outputs. Our protocol is based on the sub-exponential security of standard assumptions plus a special type of non-interactive non-malleable commitment. At the heart of our approach is a two-round multi-party conditional disclosure of secrets (MCDS) protocol in the plain model from bilinear maps, which is constructed from techniques introduced in [Benhamouda and Lin, TCC 2020].

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2021
superpolynomial simulationsecure multi-party computationconditional disclosure of secrets
Contact author(s)
amita2 @ illinois edu
bartusek james @ gmail com
vipul @ cmu edu
dakshita @ illinois edu
giulio malavolta @ hotmail it
2021-09-20: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Amit Agarwal and James Bartusek and Vipul Goyal and Dakshita Khurana and Giulio Malavolta},
      title = {Two-Round Maliciously Secure Computation with Super-Polynomial Simulation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/1230},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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