Paper 2021/1221
Simple, Fast Malicious Multiparty Private Set Intersection
Ofri Nevo, Ni Trieu, and Avishay Yanai
Abstract
We address the problem of multiparty private set intersection against a malicious adversary.
First, we show that when one can assume no collusion amongst corrupted parties then there exists an extremely efficient protocol given only symmetric-key primitives.
Second, we present a protocol secure against an adversary corrupting any strict subset of the parties. Our protocol is based on the recently introduced primitives: oblivious programmable PRF (OPPRF) and oblivious key-value store (OKVS).
Our protocols follow the client-server model where each party is either a client or a server. However, in contrast to previous works where the client has to engage in an expensive interactive cryptographic protocol, our clients need only send a single key to each server and a single message to a {\em pivot} party (where message size is in the order of the set size). Our experiments show that the client's load improves by up to
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. ACM CCS 2021
- DOI
- 10.1145/3460120.3484772
- Keywords
- private set intersectionpsi
- Contact author(s)
- ay yanay @ gmail com
- History
- 2021-09-20: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1221
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1221, author = {Ofri Nevo and Ni Trieu and Avishay Yanai}, title = {Simple, Fast Malicious Multiparty Private Set Intersection}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1221}, year = {2021}, doi = {10.1145/3460120.3484772}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1221} }