Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1179

Improved Attacks on GIFT-64

Ling Sun and Wei Wang and Meiqin Wang

Abstract: One of the well-known superiorities of GIFT-64 over PRESENT lies in the correction of the strong linear hull effect. However, apart from the investigation of the 9-round linear hull effect in the design document, we find no linear attack result on GIFT-64. Although we do not doubt the security of GIFT-64 regarding the linear cryptanalysis, the actual resistance of the cipher to the linear attack should be evaluated since it promotes a comprehensive perception of the soundness of GIFT-64. Motivated by this observation, we implement an automatic search and find a 12-round linear distinguisher whose dominating trail is an optimal linear characteristic. Following that, the first 19-round linear attack is launched by utilising the newly identified distinguisher. On the other side, we notice that the previous differential attack of GIFT-64 covering 20 rounds claims the entire codebook. To reduce the data complexity of the 20-round attack, we apply the automatic method to exhaustively check 13-round differential trails with probabilities no less than $2^{-64}$ and identify multiple 13-round differentials facilitating 20-round attacks without using the full codebook. One of the candidate differentials with the maximum probability and the minimum number of guessed subkey bits is then employed to realise the first 20-round differential attack without relying on the complete codebook. Given the newly obtained results, we conjecture that the resistances of GIFT-64 against differential and linear attacks do not have a significant gap. Also, we note that the attack results in this paper are far from threatening the security of GIFT-64.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Linear cryptanalysis, Differential cryptanalysis, GIFT-64

Original Publication (in the same form): SAC 2021

Date: received 14 Sep 2021

Contact author: lingsun at sdu edu cn, weiwangsdu at sdu edu cn, mqwang at sdu edu cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210914:180256 (All versions of this report)

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