Paper 2021/1159
Compact and Malicious Private Set Intersection for Small Sets
Mike Rosulek and Ni Trieu
Abstract
We describe a protocol for two-party private set intersection (PSI) based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The protocol is proven secure against malicious parties, in the ideal permutation + random oracle model. For small sets (500 items or fewer), our protocol requires the least time and communication of any known PSI protocol, even ones that are only semi-honest secure and ones that are not based on Diffie-Hellman. It is one of the few significant improvements to the 20-year old classical Diffie-Hellman PSI protocol of Huberman, Franklin, and Hogg (ACM Elec. Commerce 1999). Our protocol is actually a generic transformation that constructs PSI from a class of key agreement protocols. This transformation is inspired by a technique of Cho, Dachman-Soled, and Jarecki (CT-RSA 2016), which we streamline and optimize in several important ways to achieve our superior efficiency.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. ACM CCS 2021
- DOI
- 10.1145/3460120.3484778
- Keywords
- private set intersection
- Contact author(s)
-
rosulekm @ eecs oregonstate edu
nitrieu @ asu edu - History
- 2021-10-18: last of 2 revisions
- 2021-09-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1159
- License
-
CC BY