Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1124

A Semi-Permanent Stuck-At Fault Analysis on AES Rijndael SBox

Priyanka Joshi and Bodhisatwa Mazumdar

Abstract: Fault attacks have gained particular attention in recent years as they present a severe threat to security in rapidly rising Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. IoT devices are generally security-critical and resource-constrained. Therefore, any security protocol deployed in these devices has to satisfy several constraints such as small area footprint, low power, and memory consumption. Combinational circuit implementation of S-box is preferable over look-up table (LUT) in terms of memory consumption as the memory operations are usually the costliest part of lightweight cipher implementations. In this work, we analyze the S-box of AES against a novel fault analysis technique, Semi-Permanent Stuck-At (SPSA) fault analysis. We pinpoint hotspots in an optimized implementation of AES S-box that weaken the cryptographic properties of the S-box, leading to key recovery attacks. Our work investigates new vulnerabilities towards fault analysis in combinational circuit implementation.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Fault attacks, AES, Lightweight ciphers, Combinational circuit, Semi-permanent, Stuck-at.

Date: received 3 Sep 2021

Contact author: phd1801201001 at iiti ac in, bodhisatwa at iiti ac in

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210906:074351 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1124


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