Paper 2021/1124
A Semi-Permanent Stuck-At Fault Analysis on AES Rijndael SBox
Priyanka Joshi and Bodhisatwa Mazumdar
Abstract
Fault attacks have gained particular attention in recent years as they present a severe threat to security in rapidly rising Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. IoT devices are generally security-critical and resource-constrained. Therefore, any security protocol deployed in these devices has to satisfy several constraints such as small area footprint, low power, and memory consumption. Combinational circuit implementation of S-box is preferable over look-up table (LUT) in terms of memory consumption as the memory operations are usually the costliest part of lightweight cipher implementations. In this work, we analyze the S-box of AES against a novel fault analysis technique, Semi-Permanent Stuck-At (SPSA) fault analysis. We pinpoint hotspots in an optimized implementation of AES S-box that weaken the cryptographic properties of the S-box, leading to key recovery attacks. Our work investigates new vulnerabilities towards fault analysis in combinational circuit implementation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Fault attacksAESLightweight ciphersCombinational circuitSemi-permanentStuck-at.
- Contact author(s)
-
phd1801201001 @ iiti ac in
bodhisatwa @ iiti ac in - History
- 2021-09-06: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1124
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1124,
author = {Priyanka Joshi and Bodhisatwa Mazumdar},
title = {A Semi-Permanent Stuck-At Fault Analysis on {AES} Rijndael {SBox}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1124},
year = {2021},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1124}
}
