Paper 2021/1112

Key agreement: security / division

Daniel R. L. Brown

Abstract

Some key agreement schemes, such as Diffie--Hellman key agreement, reduce to Rabi--Sherman key agreement, in which Alice sends $ab$ to Charlie, Charlie sends $bc$ to Alice, they agree on key $a(bc)=(ab)c$, where multiplicative notation here indicates some specialized associative binary operation. All non-interactive key agreement schemes, where each peer independently determines a single delivery to the other, reduce to this case, because the ability to agree implies the existence of an associative operation. By extending the associative operation’s domain, the key agreement scheme can be enveloped into a mathematical ring, such that all cryptographic values are ring elements, and all key agreement computations are ring multiplications. (A smaller envelope, a semigroup instead of a ring, is also possible.) Security relies on the difficulty of division: here, meaning an operator $$ such that $$. Security also relies on the difficulty of the less familiar wedge operation $$. When Rabi--Sherman key agreement is instantiated as Diffie--Hellman key agreement: its multiplication amounts to modular exponentiation; its division amounts to the discrete logarithm problem; the wedge operation amounts to the computational Diffie--Hellman problem. Ring theory is well-developed and implies efficient division algorithms in some specific rings, such as matrix rings over fields. Semigroup theory, though less widely-known, also implies efficient division in specific semigroups, such as group-like semigroups. The rarity of key agreement schemes with well-established security suggests that easy multiplication with difficult division (and wedges) is elusive. Reduction of key agreement to ring or semigroup multiplication is not a panacea for cryptanalysis. Nonetheless, novel proposals for key agreement perhaps ought to run the gauntlet of a checklist for vulnerability to well-known division strategies that generalize across several forms of multiplication. Ambitiously applying this process of elimination to a plethora of diverse rings or semigroups might also, if only by a fluke, leave standing a few promising schemes, which might then deserve a more focused cryptanalysis.

Note: Updates over previous version: cited 2 new papers about discrete logarithms in semigroups. Banin and Tsaban reduce semigroup discrete logs to group discrete logs. Childs and Ivanyos find quantum algorithms for semigroup discrete logs. Neither paper significantly impacts the way that semigroups are used in this report, since it is multiplication in the semigroup, not exponentiation in the semigroup, which this semigroup focuses. So, division not logarithm is the main attack strategies. In special cases, discrete logarithms can be used to divide, so this report therefore cites these two papers on semigroup discrete logarithms.