Paper 2021/1107
Multi-Leak Deep-Learning Side-Channel Analysis
Fanliang Hu, Huanyu Wang, and Junnian Wang
Abstract
Deep Learning Side-Channel Attacks (DLSCAs) have become a realistic threat to implementations of cryptographic algorithms, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). By utilizing deep-learning models to analyze side-channel measurements, the attacker is able to derive the secret key of the cryptographic alrgorithm. However, when traces have multiple leakage intervals for a specific attack point, the majority of existing works train neural networks on these traces directly, without a appropriate preprocess step for each leakage interval. This degenerates the quality of profiling traces due to the noise and non-primary components. In this paper, we first divide the multi-leaky traces into leakage intervals and train models on different intervals separately. Afterwards, we concatenate these neural networks to build the final network, which is called multi-input model. We test the proposed multi-input model on traces captured from STM32F3 microcontroller implementations of AES-128 and show a 2-fold improvement over the previous single-input attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. IEEE ACCESS
- DOI
- 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3152831
- Keywords
- AESDeep learningMultiple leakageMulti-input modelSide-channel attacks
- Contact author(s)
- fanliang @ mail hnust edu cn
- History
- 2022-03-06: revised
- 2021-08-31: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1107
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1107, author = {Fanliang Hu and Huanyu Wang and Junnian Wang}, title = {Multi-Leak Deep-Learning Side-Channel Analysis}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/1107}, year = {2021}, doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3152831}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1107} }