Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/109
Sequential Logic Encryption Against Model Checking Attack
Amin Rezaei and Hai Zhou
Abstract: Due to high IC design costs and emergence of countless untrusted foundries, logic encryption has been taken into consideration more than ever. In state-of-the-art logic encryption works, a lot of performance is sold to guarantee security against both the SAT-based and the removal attacks. However, the SAT-based attack cannot decrypt the sequential circuits if the scan chain is protected or if the unreachable states encryption is adopted. Instead, these security schemes can be defeated by the model checking attack that searches iteratively for different input sequences to put the activated IC to the desired reachable state. In this paper, we propose a practical logic encryption approach to defend against the model checking attack on sequential circuits. The robustness of the proposed approach is demonstrated by experiments on around fifty benchmarks.
Category / Keywords: applications / Model Checking Attack, Sequential Logic Encryption, Sequential Transformation, Sequential Encryption
Original Publication (in the same form): Proceedings of 24th Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 2021
Date: received 28 Jan 2021
Contact author: me at aminrezaei com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20210201:072216 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2021/109
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]