## Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1054

One-time Traceable Ring Signatures

Alessandra Scafuro and Bihan Zhang

Abstract: A ring signature allows a party to sign messages anonymously on behalf of a group, which is called ring. Traceable ring signatures are a variant of ring signatures that limits the anonymity guarantees, enforcing that a member can sign anonymously at most one message per tag. Namely, if a party signs two different messages for the same tag, it will be de-anomymized. This property is very useful in decentralized platforms to allow members to anonymously endorse statements in a controlled manner. In this work we introduce one-time traceable ring signatures, where a member can sign anonymously only one message. This natural variant suffices in many applications for which traceable ring signatures are useful, and enables us to design a scheme that only requires a few hash evaluations and outperforms existing (non one-time) schemes.

Our one-time traceable ring signature scheme presents many advantages: it is fast, with a signing time of less than 1 second for a ring of $2^{10}$ signers (and much less for smaller rings); it is {\em post-quantum resistant}, as it only requires hash evaluations; it is extremely simple, as it requires only a black-box access to a generic hash function (modeled as a random oracle) and no other cryptographic operation is involved. From a theoretical standpoint our scheme is also the first anonymous signature scheme based on a black-box access to a symmetric-key primitive. All existing anonymous signatures are either based on specific hardness assumptions (e.g., LWE, SIS, etc.) or use the underlying symmetric-key primitive in a non-black-box way, i.e., they leverage the circuit representation of the primitive.

Category / Keywords: foundations / Digital Signatures, Anonymous Signatures

Original Publication (in the same form): ESORICS

Date: received 13 Aug 2021

Contact author: ascafur at ncsu edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1054

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