Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1029

LOVE a pairing

Diego F. Aranha and Elena Pagnin and Francisco Rodríguez-Henríquez

Abstract: The problem of securely outsourcing the computation of a bilinear pairing has been widely investigated in the literature. Designing an efficient protocol with the desired functionality has, however, been an open challenge for a long time. Recently, Di Crescenzo et al. (CARDIS’20) proposed the first suite of protocols for securely and efficiently delegating pairings with online inputs under the presence of a malicious server. We progress along this path with the aim of LOVE (Lowering the cost of Outsourcing and Verifying Efficiently) a pairing. Our contributions are threefold. First, we propose a protocol (LOVE) that improves the efficiency of Di Crescenzo et al.’s proposal for securely delegating pairings with online, public inputs. Second, we provide the first implementation of efficient protocols in this setting. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our LOVE protocol in different application scenarios by benchmarking an implementation using BN, BLS12 and BLS24 pairing-friendly curves. Interestingly, compared to Di Crescenzo et al.’s protocol, LOVE is up to 29.7% faster for the client, up to 24.9% for the server and requires 23-24% less communication cost depending on the choice of parameters. Furthermore, we note that our LOVE protocol is especially suited for subgroup-secure groups: checking the correctness of the delegated pairing requires up to 56.2% less computations than evaluating the pairing locally (no delegation). This makes LOVE the most efficient protocol to date for securely outsourcing the computation of a pairing with online public inputs, even when the server is malicious.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / pairing, verifiable delegation, implementation

Original Publication (with minor differences): Latincrypt 2021, the Seventh International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America

Date: received 6 Aug 2021, last revised 23 Sep 2021

Contact author: elena pagnin at eit lth se

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210923:150016 (All versions of this report)

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