Paper 2021/042
Correcting Subverted Random Oracles
Alexander Russell, Qiang Tang, Moti Yung, Hong-Sheng Zhou, and Jiadong Zhu
Abstract
The random oracle methodology has proven to be a powerful tool for designing and reasoning about cryptographic schemes. In this paper, we focus on the basic problem of correcting faulty—or adversarially corrupted—random oracles, so that they can be confidently applied for such cryptographic purposes. We prove that a simple construction can transform a “subverted” random oracle—which disagrees with the original one at a small fraction of inputs—into an object that is indifferentiable from a random function, even if the adversary is made aware of all randomness used in the transformation. Our results permit future designers of cryptographic primitives in typical kleptographic settings (i.e., those permitting adversaries that subvert or replace basic cryptographic algorithms) to use random oracles as a trusted black box.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2018
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-96881-0_9
- Keywords
- kleptographycliptographyrandom oraclesindifferenttiability
- Contact author(s)
-
qtang84 @ gmail com
jiadong zhu @ uconn edu - History
- 2021-01-12: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/042
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/042,
author = {Alexander Russell and Qiang Tang and Moti Yung and Hong-Sheng Zhou and Jiadong Zhu},
title = {Correcting Subverted Random Oracles},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/042},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-96881-0_9},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/042}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/042}
}
