Paper 2020/976

Synchronizable Exchange

Ranjit Kumaresan, Srinivasan Raghuraman, and Adam Sealfon

Abstract

Fitzi, Garay, Maurer, and Ostrovsky (Journal of Cryptology 2005) showed that in the presence of a dishonest majority, no primitive of cardinality $n - 1$ is complete for realizing an arbitrary $n$-party functionality with guaranteed output delivery. In this work, we introduce a new $2$-party primitive $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$ (``synchronizable fair exchange'') and show that it is complete for realizing any $n$-party functionality with fairness in a setting where all $n$ parties are pairwise connected by independent instances of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$. In the $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$-hybrid model, the two parties load $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$ with some input, and following this, either party can trigger $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$ with a suitable ``witness'' at a later time to receive the output from $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$. Crucially the other party also receives output from $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$ when $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$ is triggered. The trigger witnesses allow us to synchronize the trigger phases of multiple instances of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$, thereby aiding in the design of fair multiparty protocols. Additionally, a pair of parties may reuse a single a priori loaded instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{SyX}}$ in any number of multiparty protocols (possibly involving different sets of parties).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
secure multiparty computationfair exchangecompletenesspreprocessing
Contact author(s)
rakumare @ visa com
srraghur @ visa com
asealfon @ berkeley edu
History
2020-10-07: last of 2 revisions
2020-08-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/976
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/976,
      author = {Ranjit Kumaresan and Srinivasan Raghuraman and Adam Sealfon},
      title = {Synchronizable Exchange},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/976},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/976}
}
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