## Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/965

Computation of a 30750-Bit Binary Field Discrete Logarithm

Robert Granger and Thorsten Kleinjung and Arjen K. Lenstra and Benjamin Wesolowski and Jens Zumbragel

Abstract: This paper reports on the computation of a discrete logarithm in the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^{30750}}$, breaking by a large margin the previous record, which was set in January 2014 by a computation in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{9234}}$. The present computation made essential use of the elimination step of the quasi-polynomial algorithm due to Granger, Kleinjung and Zumbr\"agel, and is the first large-scale experiment to truly test and successfully demonstrate its potential when applied recursively, which is when it leads to the stated complexity. It required the equivalent of about $2900$ core years on a single core of an Intel Xeon Ivy Bridge processor running at 2.6 GHz, which is comparable to the approximately $3100$ core years expended for the discrete logarithm record for prime fields, set in a field of bit-length $795$, and demonstrates just how much easier the problem is for this level of computational effort. In order to make the computation feasible we introduced several innovative techniques for the elimination of small degree irreducible elements, which meant that we avoided performing any costly Gr\"obner basis computations, in contrast to all previous records since early 2013. While such computations are crucial to the $L(\frac{1}{4} + o(1))$ complexity algorithms, they were simply too slow for our purposes. Finally, this computation should serve as a serious deterrent to cryptographers who are still proposing to rely on the discrete logarithm security of such finite fields in applications, despite the existence of two quasi-polynomial algorithms and the prospect of even faster algorithms being developed.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Discrete logarithm problem, finite fields, binary fields, quasi-polynomial algorithm

Date: received 7 Aug 2020, last revised 7 Aug 2020

Contact author: r granger at surrey ac uk,thorsten kleinjung@epfl ch,arjen lenstra@epfl ch,benjamin wesolowski@math u-bordeaux fr,jens zumbraegel@uni-passau de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/965

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