Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/907

Enhanced Flush+Reload Attack on AES

Milad Seddigh and Hadi Soleimany

Abstract: In cloud computing, multiple users can share the same physical machine that can potentially leak secret information, in particular when the memory de-duplication is enabled. Flush+Reload attack is a cache-based attack that makes use of resource sharing. T-table implementation of AES is commonly used in the crypto libraries like OpenSSL. Several Flush+Reload attacks on T-table implementation of AES have been proposed in the literature which requires a notable number of encryptions. In this paper, we present a technique to enhance the Flush+Reload attack on AES in the ciphertext-only scenario by significantly reducing the number of needed encryptions in both native and cross-VM setups. In this paper, we focus on finding the wrong key candidates and keep the right key by considering only the cache miss event. Our attack is faster than previous Flush+Reload attacks. In particular, our method can speed-up the Flush+Reload attack in cross-VM environment significantly. To verify the theoretical model, we implemented the proposed attack.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Flush+Reload, AES, T-table implementation

Original Publication (in the same form): ISC International Journal of Information Security

Date: received 18 Jul 2020

Contact author: milladseddigh7 at gmail com,hadi soleimany@gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200718:161650 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/907


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