Paper 2020/883

On The Deployment of Tweak-in-Plaintext Protection Against Differential Fault Analysis

Jeroen Delvaux

Abstract

In an article from HOST 2018, which appears in extended form in the Cryptology ePrint Archive, Baksi, Bhasin, Breier, Khairallah, and Peyrin proposed the tweak-in-plaintext method to protect block ciphers against a differential fault analysis (DFA). We argue that this method lacks existential motivation as neither of its two envisioned use cases, i.e., the electronic codebook (ECB) and the cipher block chaining (CBC) modes of operation, is competitive. Furthermore, in a variant of the method where nonces are generated using a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), several security problems have not been anticipated for. Finally, we analyze the security level against a brute-force DFA more rigorously than in the original work.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
differential fault analysiscipher block chainingprovable security
Contact author(s)
jeroen delvaux @ osr-tech com
History
2020-07-16: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/883
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/883,
      author = {Jeroen Delvaux},
      title = {On The Deployment of Tweak-in-Plaintext Protection Against Differential Fault Analysis},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/883},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/883}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.