Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/879

Second-Order Masked Lookup Table Compression Scheme

Annapurna Valiveti and Srinivas Vivek

Abstract: Masking by lookup table randomisation is a well-known technique used to achieve side-channel attack resistance for software implementations, particularly, against DPA attacks. The randomised table technique for first- and second-order security requires about m * 2^n bits of RAM to store an (n, m)-bit masked S-box lookup table. Table compression helps in reducing the amount of memory required, and this is useful for highly resource-constrained IoT devices. Recently, Vadnala (CT-RSA 2017) proposed a randomised table compression scheme for first- and second-order security in the probing leakage model. This scheme reduces the RAM memory required by about a factor of 2^l, where l is a compression parameter. Vivek (Indocrypt 2017) demonstrated an attack against the second-order scheme of Vadnala. Hence achieving table compression at second and higher orders is an open problem.

In this work, we propose a second-order secure randomised table compression scheme which works for any (n, m)-bit S-box. Our proposal is a variant of Vadnala's scheme that is not only secure but also significantly improves the time-memory trade-off. Specifically, we improve the online execution time by a factor of 2^(n-l). Our proposed scheme is proved 2-SNI secure in the probing leakage model. We have implemented our method for AES-128 on a 32-bit ARM Cortex processor. We are able to reduce the memory required to store a randomised S-box table for second-order AES-128 implementation to 59 bytes.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Masking, S-box, Table compression, Probing leakage model, SNI security, Side-channel attacks, IoT security, Software implementation

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-CHES-2020

Date: received 12 Jul 2020, last revised 17 Jul 2020

Contact author: annapurna at iiitb org,srinivas vivek@iiitb ac in

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200717:165753 (All versions of this report)

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