Paper 2020/871

Quantum Immune One-Time Memories

Qipeng Liu, Amit Sahai, and Mark Zhandry


One-time memories (OTM) are the hardware version of oblivious transfer, and are useful for constructing objects that are impossible with software alone, such as one-time programs. In this work, we consider attacks on OTMs where a quantum adversary can leverage his physical access to the memory to mount quantum ``superposition attacks'' against the memory. Such attacks result in significantly weakened OTMs. For example, in the application to one-time programs, it may appear that such an adversary can always “quantumize” the classical protocol by running it on a superposition of inputs, and therefore learn superpositions of outputs of the protocol. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that this intuition is false: we construct one-time programs from quantum-accessible one-time memories where the view of an adversary, despite making quantum queries, can be simulated by making only classical queries to the ideal functionality. At the heart of our work is a method of immunizing one-time memories against superposition attacks.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
quantum cryptographyone-time memoryone-time programoblivious transfer
Contact author(s)
qipengl @ cs princeton edu
2020-07-12: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Qipeng Liu and Amit Sahai and Mark Zhandry},
      title = {Quantum Immune One-Time Memories},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/871},
      year = {2020},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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